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Executive Summary
This issue brief examines the concept of fundamental alteration under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA); specifically it considers when proposed modifications of public programs
under Title II of the ADA will be considered to amount to the type of fundamental alteration that
lies beyond judicial power to compel. The issue of when a program change constitutes a
fundamental alteration is important in state community integration planning efforts, since these
types of changes will require legislative action.
The ADA does not define the terms “reasonable modification” or “fundamental alteration” or
“undue financial and administrative burden” in monolithic style to be applied across all cases and in
all situations. The terms are contextual and depend in part on the specific programs and activities to
which they apply and thus can be understood only in the context of their application, by carefully
weighing the evidence.
Fundamental alteration caselaw since the United States Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead v
L.C. suggests that courts are likely to closely scrutinize a fundamental alteration defense raised by a

state once plaintiffs have made a showing of medically unnecessary institutionalization. At the same
time, courts will classify a proposed change as fundamental in nature in those cases in which
evidence is presented that a public program’s requirements and design are indispensable to its
essential nature. When a state is shown to have a history of waiving its own requirements and
program rules, courts will find the proposed modification reasonable and not of a fundamental
nature.
The implications of this standard for behavioral health policy are important. Many of the program
changes needed by qualified persons with disabilities related to behavioral health are ones that
require what courts view as basic alteration in program design, including across-the-board changes in
Medicaid coverage limits. In the case of other programs and services, individuals may require
changes in eligibility rules applicable to community health, housing, and support services, as well as
greater levels of investment into community-based service alternatives.
Identifying modifications that amount to a fundamental alteration should be a feature of all postOlmstead planning activities, particularly in the case of persons with disabilities whose unnecessary
institutionalization is relatively common, such as persons with mental disabilities. To be considered
“effectively working” as required by the Olmstead decision, state plans presumably should identify
those broader investments that are required to achieve community integration, that require
“fundamental alterations” in public programs, and a timetable for achieving such change.
The goal of the ADA is to promote community integration. To achieve this goal the law identifies
two levels of necessary changes: reasonable modifications in programs and fundamental alterations.
The former is within the purview of courts to order as a remedial matter, while the latter lies within
the purview of the legislative process and is therefore particularly germane to long term process of
creating “effectively working plans.”
Cases decided under the ADA and its predecessor statute §504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,
suggest that a finding of medically unreasonable exclusion and segregation will trigger closer scrutiny
by courts and that funding alone will not deter a reasonable modification order. However,
effectuating changes in insurance coverage, particularly Medicaid, is viewed as a matter of
fundamental alteration. In deciding the issue, courts will take a contextual approach, examining the
needs of all persons with disabilities, not merely the subgroup for whom community residence is
appropriate.
What this means for persons with mental disabilities is that essential changes in insurance coverage,
the creation of alternative community residential placements, and other investments that make
community residences possible, are the types of changes that courts probably would consider
fundamental. Of particular importance may better coverage of outpatient rehabilitation and clinical
services, greater access to personal attendant services in the case of persons who need an attendant
or support with mental health needs only, and targeted case management to ensure support for
behavioral-related disabilities. Because these changes are considered fundamental, the Olmstead
planning process to develop long-term investments becomes critical. Federal supports such as the
New Freedom Initiative can promote this type of change and investment and presumably will spur
the types of deeper changes that lie beyond the purview of judicial orders.
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Introduction
This issue brief examines the requirement in Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) that persons with disabilities (including persons with mental illness and addiction disorders
(MI/AD) be provided health care and related support services in the most integrated settings when
medically appropriate. It further examines how the ADA’s concepts of “reasonable modification”
and “fundamental alteration” may affect a public agency’s community integration obligations under
the law. These intertwined legal principles of community integration, reasonable modification, and
fundamental alteration lie at the heart of the ADA.
In its landmark 1999 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C.,1 a case involving two
women in Georgia with mental disabilities who were inappropriately institutionalized in an inpatient
psychiatric unit, the Court held that under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide
persons with mental disabilities with community-based treatment rather than placement in
institutions, when: (1) the State's treatment professionals have determined that community
placement is appropriate; (2) the transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not
opposed by the affected individual; and (3) the community placement can be reasonably
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with
mental disabilities.
These requirements, as articulated in Olmstead, serve to measure the extent of public agencies’ duties
under the ADA, yet the ADA statute, its implementing regulations, and related caselaw offer few
guideposts for understanding them. Despite this limited guidance, certain judicial principles are
beginning to emerge and are the focus of this analysis.
As States engage in comprehensive planning and implementation efforts to comply with the ADA
community integration mandates outlined in the Olmstead decision,2 stakeholders who contribute to
these efforts need to have thorough and timely information about the ADA’s underlying principles.
How various courts have interpreted the meaning and scope of reasonable modification and
fundamental alteration, and the judicial perspectives they have taken, serve to illuminate and inform
the choices that face State lawmakers, State agency directors, persons with disabilities and their
advocates, and the providers who serve persons with disabilities. It may be that changes that are
determined by stakeholders to amount to fundamental alterations can be identified as candidates for
long-term reform efforts and prioritization. On the other hand, those changes that have the
characteristics of reasonable modifications may be more readily accomplished within a relatively
short time frame through either formal or informal public agency action, depending on the scope of
administrative powers granted an agency by a State legislature. The purpose of this issue brief is to
provide readers with critical information derived from relevant ADA-related caselaw that will assist
in making these distinctions.

1

119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
Rosenbaum, S. Issue Brief #17: “Olmstead v L.C.: Federal Implementation Guidelines and an Analysis of Recent Cases
Regarding Medicaid Coverage of Long Term Care Services for Persons with Disabilities.” Prepared for the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. October 2001. Available at http://www.samhsa.gov/omc.
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This issue brief begins with a brief review of the ADA, including an overview of the law and
provisions relevant to community integration, fundamental alteration and reasonable modification. It
also summarizes the specific provisions of the ADA that relate to persons with mental illness and
addiction disorder disabilities. The issue brief then reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead
and describes the principles that the decision sets forth for applying ADA community integration
requirements to public programs. It then reviews community integration cases decided since
Olmstead and discusses and synthesizes these decisions and their implications for post-Olmstead
planning related to community based services for persons with MI/AD conditions.
The accompanying Appendix contains short summaries of each of referenced case, highlighting the
relevant claims and defenses relating to reasonable modifications, fundamental alteration, and the
ADA’s community integration mandate.
Background and Overview
Brief Review of the ADA and Pertinent Definitions
The ADA, enacted in 1990, is a remedial law that built upon earlier legislative efforts to end the
discrimination and segregation that characterized public and private treatment of persons with
disabilities. The ADA consists of several titles reaching discrimination in both public and private
settings.3 The ADA represented a far-reaching expansion of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act by
articulating Congress’ awareness of the historical inequities of discriminatory policies and practices
against persons with disabilities, and its intent to address them by imposing duties on public entities
to ensure that such policies and practices be eliminated. As stated in the ADA’s Final Rule:
Taken together, these provisions are intended to prohibit exclusion and segregation of
individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others, based
on, among other things, presumptions, patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about
individuals with disabilities. Consistent with these standards, public entities are required to
ensure that their actions are based on facts applicable to individuals and not on
presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do. Integration
is fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Provision of
segregated accommodations and services relegates persons with disabilities to second-class
status.4

Title II of the ADA5 applies to public program and tracks its predecessor law (§504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 19736). Title II sets forth certain basic requirements regarding treatment of
persons with disabilities by programs and activities operated by public entities. Figure 1
summarizes these requirements, including the ADA’s treatment of persons with MI/AD as qualified
persons.
3 Rand Rosenblatt, Sara Rosenbaum and David Frankford, Law and the American Health Care System (2001-2002
Supplement) Foundation Press, NY, NY.
4 Final Rule implementing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130.
5 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA also comprises Title I, which prohibits discrimination in employment and employersponsored benefits and Title III, which prohibits discrimination in access to places of public accommodation, and other
Titles not addressed by this issue brief.
6 29 U.S.C. 794.
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Figure 1. Key Elements of Title II of the ADA
TERM
Responsibilities
of public
entities
Public entity
Qualified
individual with a
disability
Disability

Specific MI/AD
conditions that
are considered
to be disabling

DEFINITION
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
[…]any State or local government or any department, agency, special purpose district, or
any other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.7
[…] an individual who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices […] meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.8
[…] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment.9
[A]ny mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.10 [Included are]
[…] mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, […] drug
addiction, and alcoholism.11 The following conditions are not included in the definition
of disability: homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or
pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of
drugs.12 [emphasis added]

Final regulations implementing Title II clarified the exclusion of persons engaged in the “current
illegal use of drugs” from ADA protections. The Preamble made clear that the exclusion is intended
to permit program exclusions based on current illegal drug use but not as a basis for denying ADA
protections to persons with addiction disorders:
Addiction is a disability, and addicts are individuals with disabilities protected by the Act.
The protection, however, does not extend to actions based on the illegal use of the
substance. In other words, an addict cannot use the fact of his or her addiction as a defense
to an action based on illegal use of drugs. This distinction is not artificial. Congress
intended to deny protection to people who engage in the illegal use of drugs, whether or not
they are addicted, but to provide protection to addicts so long as they are not currently using
drugs. […] Paragraph (b) […] prohibits denial of health services, or services provided in
connection with drug rehabilitation to an individual on the basis of current illegal use of
drugs, if the individual is otherwise entitled to services. […] [B]ut, once an individual has
been admitted to a program, abstention may be a necessary and appropriate condition to
continued participation. The final rule therefore provides that a drug rehabilitation or

7 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(A)-(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999.) State and local governments and their agencies operate a variety
of services and programs for persons with MI/AD disabilities, including institutional, residential, and ambulatory care.
As such, they are considered covered entities for purposes of Title II.
8 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
9 42 U.S. C. § 12102(2). “Major life activities” includes “caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2001).
10 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2001).
11 Id.
12 42 U.S.C. § 12211.
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treatment program may prohibit illegal use of drugs by individuals while they are
participating in the program13

The ADA Concepts of Integrated Setting, Reasonable Modification, and Fundamental Alteration
Federal regulations implementing Title II of the ADA require that public entities administer their
programs in “the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of” a “qualified individual with a
disability”.
[…] [T]he public entity must administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities, i.e., in a
setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the
fullest extent possible, and that persons with disabilities must be provided the option of
declining to accept a particular accommodation.”14

In order to achieve this objective, the rules also require that a covered entity make “reasonable
modifications” in its programs and activities in order to avoid discrimination, unless it can show that
making the modification would “fundamentally alter” the nature of its service, program or activity:
A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,
unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.15 […] [I]n meeting the program’s
accessibility requirement, a public entity is not required to take any action that would result
in a fundamental alteration in the nature of its service, program, or activity or in undue
financial and administrative burdens. […] This paragraph does not establish an absolute
defense; it does not relieve a public entity of all obligations to individuals with disabilities.
Although a public entity is not required to take actions that would result in a fundamental
alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and
administrative burdens, it nevertheless must take any other steps necessary to ensure that
individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity. […]
In determining whether financial and administrative burdens are undue, all public entity
resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity
should be considered. The burden of proving that compliance with paragraph (a) of §
35.150 would fundamentally alter the nature of a service, program, or activity or would result
in undue financial and administrative burdens rests with the public entity.16

The statute and regulations do not define the terms “reasonable modification” or “fundamental
alteration” or “undue financial and administrative burden” in monolithic terms to be applied across
all cases and in all situations. This reflects Congress’ awareness of the wide, state-by-state variation
in programs and services for persons with physical and mental disabilities and indicates
13.28 C.F.R. § 35.131. “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services.” Final
Rule. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General. January 26, 1992. Available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/reg2.html. Accessed February 7, 2002.
14 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
15 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
16 Final Rule implementing 28 C.F.R. §35.135(a)(3).
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Congressional desire that these terms be interpreted contextually in specific circumstances through
the weighing of evidence. Fact specific terms and measures, coupled with a private right of action to
enforce the guarantee of non-discrimination, mean that litigation under the ADA has become quite
common. When litigation does arise, the duty of the courts is to determine whether a proposed
change in a public program sought by a person with a disability is simply a reasonable modification
in program administration or a fundamental alteration in program structure or design.
The Olmstead case, discussed below, offers an example of changes that were viewed by the Court as
simply a reasonable modification in state practices, since the relief sought by plaintiffs (two Medicaid
eligible women with mental illness) was the right to one of the state’s federally approved Medicaid
home and community care slots in lieu of medically inappropriate institutional care. Although it did
not reach the issue on its merits, the majority opinion’s analysis of the women’s circumstances
suggested at least that it did not view the state’s failure to fully fund its approved home and
community care program as the basis for a fundamental alteration defense.
But often the problem is far more complex than having an approved Medicaid plan that is not fully
funded, not only a potential violation of the ADA but of the Medicaid program itself.17 Take for
example an institutionalized person for whom medical care is appropriate but who is on a waiting
list for an approved community placement, not because the state’s approved program is
underfunded but because even at fully funded levels, the state’s program is not capable of meeting
community placement needs. Under the ADA the burden will be on the plaintiff to prove that a
modification (in this case an actual expansion of the home care program) is reasonable. (Some
courts, however, have extended the claimants’ obligation to also prove that the modification does
not amount to a fundamental alteration.)18 If the court finds prima facie evidence of reasonableness,
then it will be up to the defendants to show why in fact the proposal amounts to a fundamental
alteration of the program.
Regardless of how the burdens of proof are allocated, once a court concludes based on the evidence
that the modification a plaintiff claims is reasonable is actually a fundamental alteration of the
program or activity in question, the public agency has a total affirmative defense. Even if the
practice or policy has been shown to be discriminatory, the modifications required of the public
entity are deemed to be so great or so financially and/or administratively burdensome that they
exceed what the ADA requires the public entity to reasonably do. In effect, the issue becomes a
matter for the political, rather than the judicial, process. For this reason, the point at which a
proposed modification becomes a fundamental alteration is critical in understanding the scope and
reach of the ADA. The following section discusses how the courts have assessed this “tipping
point” and the implications this has for treatment of persons with disabilities in integrated
community-based settings.
Olmstead v. L.C. and the Concept of Reasonable Modification and Fundamental Alteration

17

Alabama Nursing Home Assoc. v Harris
Smith, J. and Calandrillo, S. “Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title II Integration Lawsuits after
Olmstead v. L.C.,” 24 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 695-727 (Summer 2001).
18
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The 1999 Olmstead decision is considered a legal landmark for two important reasons. First, it
established that medically unnecessary institutionalization constitutes discrimination under the ADA.
Second, the decision provided additional, although ambiguous, standards for measuring when public
agencies have satisfied their obligations toward persons with disabilities under the ADA’s
community integration mandate.
Prior to Olmstead, community integration was commonly understood as a legal obligation that
required public entities to accord equal treatment between qualified persons with disabilities and
those without a disability. As long as a program or service did not discriminate against persons with
disabilities as a whole (as compared to persons without disabilities as a whole), it was assumed to
meet ADA requirements. This “equal treatment” standard was thought to be the case even if within
the group of qualified disabled persons, certain subgroup were treated differently.
The majority opinion in Olmstead effectively rejected this “disability versus non-disability” view and
held instead that the community integration obligation prohibits discrimination by public entities
within the overall class of persons with disabilities.19 The Court determined that Georgia officials
violated the ADA by continuing to unnecessarily institutionalize persons with MI/AD disabilities
while simultaneously withholding funds for approved community placement slots. Thus, treating
persons with schizophrenia differently than persons with developmental disabilities (both of which
fall within the scope of the definition of an MI/AD disability) might not have been interpreted as
amounting to discrimination.
In considering the reach of the ADA in the context of discrimination in institutionalization, the
majority opinion explored the inherent tension underlying community integration between the
concepts of reasonable modification on one hand and fundamental alteration on the other:
The State’s responsibility, once it provides community-based treatment to qualified persons
with disabilities, is not boundless. The reasonable-modifications regulation speaks of
“reasonable modification” to avoid discrimination, and allows States to resist modifications
that entail a “fundamental alteration” of the State’s services and programs. […] Sensibly
construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-modifications regulation
would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief
for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for
the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities.
In evaluating a State’s fundamental-alteration defense, [lower courts] must consider, in view
of the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing community-based care

19 See, e.g., Johnson v. Kmart, 273F. 3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001). In recent years this concept of fair treatment for all subclasses
of persons with disabilities has been extended to employers and employee benefit plans that single out certain disabilities
for more limited benefits and coverage. In this context, the “insurance safe harbor” provision in the ADA would appear
to shield employee health and disability benefit plans from liability for all but the most overtly and intentionally
discriminatory efforts to limit coverage on the basis of disability. Whether this safe harbor applies to state Medicaid
programs appears to be an open question. It is not yet clear how Olmstead’s prohibition against differential treatment in
the provision of public benefits based on disability will affect state discretion over Medicaid benefit design choices that
limit coverage based on disability.
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to the litigants, but also the range of services the state provides others with mental
disabilities, and the state’s obligation to mete out those services equitably.20

The majority opinion also established certain parameters to a public agency’s obligations
under the ADA:


First, the Court clarified that the decision to furnish public services at all is a matter of State
discretion.



Second, the Court rejected the framework articulated by lower courts and found that in
determining the level and scope of obligations owed any particular person with an MI/AD
disability, a State can weigh the potential effects of the requested modification against the
potential effects of all persons with such disabilities. In other words, the majority established
that the issue is not merely whether any single person can be served in the community for the
same or less money than in an institution, but how such a move into the community will affect
the entire group of persons with MI/AD disabilities, including person with what professionals
characterize on the basis of reasonable evidence as institutional-level needs. Thus, State officials
might be able to successfully defend against a request for services or program modification if
they can show that accommodating this request would involve a potentially harmful reduction in
services to other equally needy persons in the group. For example, a state might be able to
defend against modifications in current programs for persons with MI/AD on the ground that
such modifications would reduce necessary services to persons in need of institutional care. The
burden of proof presumably would lie with the state, but the defense would be acceptable.



Third, the Court strongly suggested that if a State were to develop an effective “comprehensive
plan” to transfer persons with MI/AD disabilities out of unnecessary institutional care into the
community, the State could successfully defend itself against a claim that it violated the
community integration mandate:
If […] the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan
for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting
list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its
institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard would be met.21

By suggesting this idea of an effective State plan, the Court appeared to signal that it assumed that
State officials would engage in ongoing identification of persons with disabilities who can live in
integrated settings and for whom institutional care is medically unnecessary. Where immediate
integration can be achieved through “reasonable modification” such changes should be
forthcoming. Where the changes involve a more “fundamental alteration” they should be pursued
through the development of “effectively working plans” that identify the more significant changes
that are required and set forth a timetable for their development.22
20

Olmstead at 597.
Id. at 603-06.
22 In July 2000, The Arc of the United States, an advocacy organization for persons with mental retardation and
developmental disabilities, surveyed States regarding progress made toward developing Olmstead plans. It found that 20
States had an Olmstead plan or were in the process of developing one. The Arc’s conclusion from its survey results was
21
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that States, in general, had made little progress in developing plans to implement the Olmstead decision, although it stated
that there may have not been adequate time since the 1999 court decision for measurable progress to have been made.
Available at http://www.thearc.org/olmstead_report.htm. Accessed February 7, 2002. In addition, since 2000, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has issued several guidelines to State officials to assist them in the
development of their plans. See Rosenbaum, S. (2001). “Issue Brief 17: Olmstead v. L.C.: Federal Implementation
Guidelines …” op. cit.; and “Under Court Order: What the Community Integration Mandate Means for People with
Mental Illness: The Supreme Court Ruling in Olmstead v. L. C.” Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law. 1999. Available
at http://www.bazelon.org. Accessed February 8, 2002. See also Rosenbaum S, Teitelbaum J, and Stewart A. “Olmstead v.
L.C.: Implications for Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services.” Health Matrix. (forthcoming, 2002).
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Cases That Address Community Integration and Fundamental Alteration
Although the concept of fundamental alteration has received significant attention, the concept first
arose under litigation to enforce ADA Title II’s predecessor, §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Southeastern Community College v. Davis23 a §504 lawsuit which
involved a nursing student who was profoundly deaf and who had requested that her federally
assisted nursing school make changes to its programs to accommodate her disability. The Court held
that the ability to hear was so basic to nursing that to require the college to alter its program would
amount to a change in the “essential nature” of nursing and nurse training. As a result, the
modifications the student asked for lay beyond the outer limits of the college’s legal obligations
under the Rehabilitation Act. The fact that her proposed modifications changed the essential nature
of nursing and nurse training made her request unreasonable according to the Court, and she was
not able to obtain the legal remedy she sought (i.e., an adapted nursing program). Davis thus
established the rule that changes to the essential nature of a public entity’s program constitute a
fundamental alteration and are not remedially required under federal disability law.
Other pre-ADA cases also have explored the limits of reasonable modifications in a §504 context.
Most notably, in Alexander v Choate,24 the Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that a State Medicaid agency
was not obligated to modify the design of its State Medicaid plan by removing a 14-day annual cap
on hospital inpatient services in order to ensure a level of coverage for persons with disabilities that
would better reflect their greater need for services.
Since the enactment of the ADA and the codification of its community integration and fundamental
alteration principles, a number of cases in addition to Olmstead have examined how far a public entity
must go to modify its existing programs and practices to achieve community integration for persons
with physical and mental disabilities. In deciding these cases, courts have taken several different
vantage points to analyze the claims and defenses and have adhered to the earlier precedent of §504.
Understanding these vantage points and caselaw trends is important to understanding the types of
proposed changes that might trigger a legal obligation under the ADA.
Figure 2, below, sets forth and groups the various cases that have dealt with the issue of
fundamental alteration and reasonable modification.

23
24

442 U.S. 397 (1979).
442 U.S. 287 (1986).
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Figure 2. – Community Integration and Fundamental Alteration Caselaw
Medical Status
1. Person Not Medically Able to be Treated in
the Community
Relevant Cases:
Greist v. Norristown State Hospital, 1997
Jeffrey v. St. Clair, 1996
Easley v. Snider, 1994

2. Community Treatment Deemed
Appropriate but Placement Not Made
Relevant Cases:
Helen L. v. DiDario, 1995
Williams v. Wasserman, 1996 and 2001
Kathleen S. v. Department of Public Welfare, 1998
Olmstead v. L.C., 1999

Program & Practice
3. Agency Use of Generally Discriminatory
Eligibility and Program Criteria
Relevant Cases:
Helen L. v. DiDario, 1995
Cramer v. Chiles, 1999
McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Assn.,
1997
Bryson v. Shumway, 2002

5. Modifications Affecting
Integrity of Agency Program
Relevant Cases:
Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
1979
Davoll v. Webb, 1996
PGA Tours, Inc. v. Martin, 2001
Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care
Authority, 2002

4. Agency Use of Discriminatory Eligibility
and Program Criteria When
Institutionalization Deemed Not Medically
Necessary
Relevant Cases:
Alexander v. Choate, 1985
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 1999

6. Modifications Affecting
Essential Eligibility Criteria
Relevant Cases:
Southeastern Community College v. Davis
1979
Easley v. Snider, 1994
Helen L. v. DiDario, 1995

7. Agency Past Willingness to
Waive Program Requirements
Relevant Cases:
Williams v. Wasserman, 1996 and 2001
Tatum v. NCAA, 1998
McPherson v. Michigan High School
Athletic Assn., 1997

Discussion of Emerging Caselaw Principles
Taken together, the cases identify a series of basic vantage points from which the courts begin their
analyses. Vantage Points 1 and 2 above can be thought of as patient-specific; that is, the court
primarily considers the status of the qualified person with a disability, particularly the extent to
which institutional care is not necessary and placement in a community-based residential setting is
appropriate. Vantage Points 3 through 7, by contrast, are cases that focus on the program for which
modification claims have been made. These cases are concerned primarily with how a public entity
program is structured and managed, i.e., its essential nature, its criteria for participation, and the
manner in which the public entity governs access to and utilization of its services. To the extent that
Olmstead linked a finding of discrimination to a state’s failure to make reasonable modifications, the
bulk of the caselaw since Olmstead has centered on vantage points 3 through 7. A discussion of each
of these trends in caselaw perspectives regarding the community integration mandate follows.
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1. Courts are unlikely to require States to provide community-based services for
persons with disabilities for whom State medical professionals have provided
credible evidence that they are not medically able to be treated in the community.
When a person with a disability is found to be not medically able to be treated in the
community, it would be a fundamental alteration to the essential purposes of both
institutional and community services to require the State to arrange community services.25
Similarly, State agencies have been found to have no obligation to make modifications in
programs where the claimants have been shown to have mental disabilities that render them
unable to live in a community-based setting.26 These types of cases hinge, of course, on a
court’s acceptance of evidence that the State’s procedures for making placement
determinations regarding the medical appropriateness of community residence meet
minimum legal standards of fairness and due process.
2. In contrast however, once there is sufficient medical evidence that community-based
care is appropriate for the person(s) with disabilities filing claims, courts are likely to
require States to make reasonable modifications for release or community residence
and reject cost as a defense. This is among the most common situations presented by a
series of ADA cases, in which a State asserts in its defense that providing the requested
service or modification (even though medically justifiable) would be too costly. Most
notable in these cases are court rulings that a State cannot use as a valid defense the fact that
its legislature failed to appropriate sufficient funds, or that it failed to adequately allocate
funds between institutional and community residency programs in its budget.27 This
rejection of cost as a defense is particularly striking when Medicaid is the source of funding,
and the only necessary modification the State needs to make is to increase the level of
financing for covered services (either by funding its already approved home and communitybased waiver slots or through greater levels of non-waivered State plan services).28 Failing to
initiate community placement activities for persons determined capable of living in the
community, while simultaneously taking steps to close an institution, has been found to be a
violation of the integrated service obligation. In this situation, courts have concluded that
requiring a State to fund community services is not a fundamental alteration of a State’s
programs.29 This suggests that once a State, through its own planning efforts, puts its
community transition program designs and expenditure arrangements into play, a court will
step in and order further modifications to ensure that the results of the redesign are not
discriminatory.
3. When States claim that changing the eligibility requirements for a program or service
would result in a fundamental alteration, courts will scrutinize the eligibility criteria
for evidence of discrimination. The evidence does not have to show that the State
specifically intended to exclude certain persons from its program, but rather that the
25

Greist v. Norristown State Hospital, No. Civ. A. 96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097 (E.D. Pa.); Jeffrey v. St. Clair, 933 F. Supp.
963 (D.Haw. 1996).
26 Easley v. Snider, 36 F. 3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).
27 Helen L. v DiDario, 46 F. 3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
28 Williams v Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524 (D. Md. 1996) and Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591; 2001 U.S. Dist.
29 Kathleen S. v. Department of Public Welfare 10 F. Supp. 2d 460; 1998 U.S. Dist.
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eligibility criteria for admission to the program have the effect of discriminating. Federal
regulations clearly stipulate that criteria that have “the effect of subjecting qualified
individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of a disability” are unlawful.30
Courts will examine evidence of discriminatory funding patterns on the part of a State (e.g.,
failing to appropriate funds for programs for persons with disabilities or failing to fully fund
home and community-based service waiver slots).31 The key question in these situations is to
what extent a State will be able to persuade the court that what may appear at first blush to
seem discriminatory is in fact a criterion or practice that is grounded in reasonable concerns
such as safety, program integrity, or promoting patient care.32 A State would have to provide
credible evidence to show the reasonableness of these concerns. A public entity would have
to demonstrate, for example, that past efforts to use less restrictive criteria have led to
documented problems or adverse outcomes.
4. Courts will pay special attention to evidence of a State’s use of discriminatory criteria
in cases in which there has been an actual finding that institutional care is not
medically necessary. Clearly the most challenging situation for a State agency’s
fundamental alteration defense is one in which the agency’s own experts have determined
that a community placement is appropriate. In these situations a State faces the possibility
that any criteria which it uses to restrict entry into available community programs will be
considered unreasonable and unlawful by virtue of their exclusion of persons for whom
community residence is, by the State’s own admission, completely appropriate. There is
perhaps only one point at which a court would not compel a State to make changes in its
programs as a matter of reasonable accommodation. This would occur when the State could
show that the program modification would amount to affirmative action to customize the
design of a program in order to make it work better for persons with disabilities. Based on
past cases, a court might interpret this argument in such a way as to convert a reasonable
accommodation into a fundamental alteration. This argument has tended to work in cases in
which the changes sought by the plaintiff involve material modifications in insurance
coverage, where the defendant can argue that changes are being sought to customize a
benefit that otherwise is exactly the same (or equally unavailable) for all insured persons.33
5. Courts generally will not require a State to modify a program in such a way that it
changes the essential nature of the program, but it may require changes that affect
more peripheral aspects. Modifications of insurance programs are considered
fundamental when they alter benefits or create coverage where there was none.
Alterations that are found to alter the kind of program offered (as opposed to altering the
degree of the program) have been found to amount to fundamental alterations. This
essentially is what Southeastern Community College was able to demonstrate in the Davis
case (i.e., that allowing deaf students into its nurse training program would change the
essential nature of nursing and nurse training). By way of other examples, allowing blind
30

28 C.F.R. §35, 130(b)(3).
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F. 3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995); Cramer v. Chiles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (S.D.Fla. 1999).
32 Smith and Candrillo, supra note 16, at 746.
33 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287; Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611 (1999) (the latter involving a proposed
modification of New York home care program to require “safety monitoring” services for a class of Medicaid
beneficiaries with mental disabilities).
31
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patrons to touch artwork in a museum or hiring a police officer who cannot make a forcible
arrest have both been identified as changes that would affect the essential nature of
museums (protecting art)34 and police forces (protecting public safety).35 The best known
“integrity” case is PGA Tours, Inc. v. Martin,36 in which the Supreme Court found that
allowing a professionally qualified golfer with a physical disability to use a cart during a PGA
tournament would not affect the integrity of the game of golf by so altering its nature that it
would no longer be the same game. Key to the Martin decision were certain facts: golfing
officials already permitted carts in the early rounds of their tournaments; the PGA’s
argument that walking in the later rounds was essential to ensuring comparable levels of
competition was refuted with evidence that Martin’s disability caused at least as great, if not
greater, levels of exhaustion; and the singular nature of the plaintiff’s predicament as a
qualified golfer with a disability whose needs could be accommodated as a unique matter.
At the same time, courts appear to consistently reject claims that modifications in Medicaid
coverage design are reasonable and will not require states to change the design of their
Medicaid program by adding coverage procedures (Rodriguez v City of New York), relaxing
coverage limits (Alexander v Choate) or seeking additional coverage in the case of home and
community based waiver programs (Bryson v Shumway). In order to prevail on a Medicaid
claim the plaintiff essentially would need to show that the coverage is already available under
the design of the state benefit plan but that the plan is being administered in a manner that
deprives the claimant of equal access.
6. Courts generally will not order a State to change a program’s eligibility requirements
once there is sufficient evidence that such requirements are indispensable to the
essential nature of the program, unless there is evidence that community-based care
is medically appropriate. When a public agency is able to demonstrate that certain
eligibility requirements related to community programs are essential to the nature of the
program, a request to modify the eligibility requirements would be considered to amount to
a fundamental alteration. For example, in a Pennsylvania case, the court accepted the State’s
argument that mental alertness (i.e., the ability hire, supervise, or fire a personal care
attendant or self-manage legal and financial affairs) was an essential and reasonable
requirement for eligibility in a particular community service program. Thus, the State was
not obligated to accept into its attendant care program persons who were not mentally alert
as a result of their disabilities, but who could live in the community with the aid of persons
who could act as surrogate decision-makers on their behalf.37 However, once a State has
determined that the person can in fact live in the community, then its arguments regarding
the fundamental nature of proposed modifications will be given higher scrutiny.
7. Courts are likely to deem modifications reasonable when a State has a history of
waiving its own eligibility requirements and program rules. When a public agency has
a history of creating exceptions to its own eligibility requirements, this may be evidence that
a proposed modification that corresponds to the agency’s past decisions is reasonable. In
34

28 C.F.R. §36 App. B. 643.
Davoll v. Webb, 943 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Colo. 1996). See Smith and Calandrillo, supra note 16, at 731.
36 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001).
37 Easley v Snider, 36 F. 3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).
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essence, the past waivers provide evidence that the eligibility requirement or program rule is
not essential or fundamental to the nature of the program. Therefore, if an agency already
has conceded that even though certain plaintiffs are technically ineligible under agency rules
to participate in a program, but that in the past these rules were waived in similar
circumstances, a court is likely to find that the requested program modification is reasonable
and does not constitute a fundamental alteration.38 At the same time, however, a State may
be able to argue that evidence of isolated examples of waiving the rules should not be used
to overturn the rules because of a potential flood of waiver requests that would overwhelm
administrative capacity and unreasonably increase the cost of the program. A State may also
be able to argue that the case-by-case weighing of waivers is in and of itself an essential
feature of the program. A State could also argue that its process of evaluating cases on an
individual basis and making exceptions when it felt appropriate is in and of itself an essential
feature of the program. If the court concurs, the proposed modifications would be
considered fundamental alterations the State would not be required to make.39
Discussion
The goal of the ADA is to promote community integration. To achieve this goal the law identifies
two levels of necessary changes: reasonable modifications in programs and fundamental alterations.
The former is within the purview of courts to order as a remedial matter, while the latter lies within
the purview of the legislative process and is therefore particularly germane to long term process of
creating “effectively working plans.”
Cases decided under the ADA and its predecessor statute §504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,
suggest that a finding of medically unreasonable exclusion and segregation will trigger closer scrutiny
by courts and that funding alone will not deter a reasonable modification order. However,
effectuating changes in insurance coverage, particularly Medicaid, is viewed as a matter of
fundamental alteration. In deciding the issue, courts will take a contextual approach, examining the
needs of all persons with disabilities, not merely the subgroup for whom community residence is
appropriate.
What this means for persons with mental disabilities is that essential changes in insurance coverage,
the creation of alternative community residential placements, and other investments that make
community residences possible, are the types of changes that courts probably would consider
fundamental. Of particular importance may better coverage of outpatient rehabilitation and clinical
services, greater access to personal attendant services in the case of persons who need an attendant
for support with mental health needs only, and targeted case management to ensure support for
behavioral-related disabilities. Because these changes are considered fundamental, the Olmstead
planning process to develop long term investments becomes critical. Federal supports such as the
New Freedom Initiative can promote this type of change and investment and presumably will spur
the types of deeper changes that lie beyond the purview of judicial orders.

38 Smith and Calandrillo, supra note 16, at 739-740; Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524 (D. Md. 1996); Tatum v.
NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
39 McPherson v Michigan High School Athletic Association, 119 F. 3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
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APPENDIX
Summaries of Cited Cases
These summaries, arranged chronologically, focus specifically on the aspects of cited cases dealing
with claims of discrimination on the basis of disability, claims for reasonable modifications, and
fundamental alteration defenses. The cases also involved other issues, such as due process rights,
which are not summarized here. To read the cases in full, the reader should refer to LEXIS-NEXIS
or other legal database retrieval information systems.
Cases Decided Prior to the 1990 Enactment of the ADA:
Southeastern Community College v. Davis 442 U.S. 397; 99 S. Ct. 2361; 60 L. Ed. 2d 980; 1979
U.S. LEXIS 38
The plaintiff, who had a serious hearing impairment, asked Southeastern Community College to
modify its nurse training program to accommodate her disability. The college determined that she
could not safely participate in normal clinical training and that ultimately it would be unsafe for her
to practice as a nurse. The plaintiff sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, alleging a violation of Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits
discrimination against an “otherwise qualified handicapped individual” in federally funded programs
“solely by reason of his handicap.” The court found in favor of the defendant.
After the case was overturned on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held that (1) Section 504 does not limit the freedom of an educational institution
to require reasonable physical qualifications for admission to a clinical training program, and
accordingly the college could, consistent with Section 504, conclude that Davis did not qualify for
admission to its nursing program, and (2) since Section 504 imposes no requirement upon an
educational institution to lower or effect substantial modifications of its standards in order to
accommodate handicapped persons, the institution's unwillingness to make major adjustments in its
nursing program to accommodate Davis did not constitute unlawful discrimination.
Alexander v. Choate 469 U.S. 287; 105 S. Ct. 712; 83 L. Ed. 2d 661; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 39
This class action suit was filed in 1980 by a group of Medicaid recipients alleging that Tennessee’s
proposal to cut from 20 to 14 the number of days which the State Medicaid program would pay
hospitals on behalf of Medicaid recipients would not only have a disproportionate effect on persons
with disabilities, but also, given their special needs for medical care, was likely to disadvantage them
disproportionately. Furthermore, they alleged that the proposed 14-day limitation was
discriminatory in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Although the State prevailed in District Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs’ claims. The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the Appeals Court decision.
In a unanimous opinion the Court ruled that, assuming that Section 504 or its implementing
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regulations did reach some claims of disparate-impact discrimination, the effect of Tennessee’s
reduction in annual inpatient coverage was not among them, since it applied equally to both people
with disabilities and those without them. In addition, the Court stated that to require the State to
evaluate the effect on persons with disabilities of every proposed program change “could lead to a
wholly unwieldy administrative and adjudicative burden.”
Cases Decided After the 1990 Enactment of the ADA:
Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 26394
The plaintiffs were two women, one with a physical disability and the other with both a physical and
mental disability, who needed surrogate decision-makers to manage their financial and legal affairs in
order to live in the community. Both plaintiffs were denied personal care attendant services
authorized under the 1986 Pennsylvania Attendant Care Services Act. The State determined that
they were ineligible to receive services under the Act since they were not “mentally alert.” The
plaintiffs sued, alleging that the “mental alertness” requirement of the Care Act violated the ADA.
The District Court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the State from excluding them from
receiving attendant care services.
The Appeals Court reversed, deciding that for this particular program, the use of surrogates would
fundamentally change the focus of the program by shifting it “from the provision of attendant care
and its societal objectives for the physically disabled to personal care services to the many thousands
of physically disabled who are often served by other specially designed State programs. The
proposed alteration would create a program that the State never envisioned when it enacted the Care
Act. The modification would create an undue and perhaps impossible burden on the State, possibly
jeopardizing the whole program, by forcing it to provide attendant care services to all physically
disabled individuals, whether or not mentally alert.” Thus, the requested modification was
determined to not be reasonable and, if accommodated, a fundamental alteration not required by the
ADA.
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2233.
The plaintiff, a physically disabled nursing home resident, alleged that Pennsylvania violated the
ADA by requiring that she receive care services in the segregated setting of a nursing home rather
than in an integrated residential setting through the State’s attendant care program. The plaintiff had
been evaluated and it was determined that while she was not fully capable of caring for herself, she
was not so incapacitated that she needed the custodial care of a nursing home.
In its defense in District Court, the State agreed that the plaintiff was qualified for residential
treatment with attendant care services but that it had not placed her in such care due to funding
constraints. It contended that it was not constitutionally authorized to shift funds already
appropriated by the State legislature from the nursing care budget line to the attendant care line. To
do so would amount to a fundamental alteration of its program. On appeal, the Appeals Court
disagreed. It found that the plaintiff was not asking the State to alter its eligibility requirements for
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admission to the program, nor was her request an unreasonable modification resulting in a
fundamental alteration of the program. In the Appeals Court’s view, the plaintiff’s request “merely
require[d] [the State] to fulfill its own obligations under State law.”
Jeffrey v. St. Clair, 933 F. Supp. 963 (D.Haw. 1996).
The plaintiffs were in the custody of the Hawaii State Hospital after being acquitted of various
criminal charges. They received treatment in an experimental program in the Cooke Building, a
more open residential environment that was designed to create a therapeutic environment in the
least restrictive setting. In 1995 the hospital decided to close the Cooke Building after determining it
did not meet fire, life, and safety standards for patients, and the plaintiffs were moved to another
building. The plaintiffs filed suit requesting a restraining order to prevent the hospital from closing
the Cooke Building. They alleged that the treatment in the second building did not meet their needs;
that the transfer could affect their ability to apply for future conditional release to the community;
and that they had suffered emotional distress.
The Court denied the plaintiffs’ request. It determined that the costs associated with renovating the
Cooke Building to bring it up to safety standards would require an extensive investment of resources
and could result in duplication of existing services at the expense of other hospital programs and
patients. The Court stated that the public’s interests were better served by judicial deference to the
decisions of qualified professionals and that the move to the other building was consistent with
professional judgment.
Davoll v. Webb, 943 F. Supp. 1289; 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15257
The plaintiffs were Denver Police Department patrol officers who had sustained work-related
injuries that prevented them from performing the essential police duties of making a forcible arrest
and firing a weapon. Following temporary assignments to light duty work and an offer for
permanent assignments to light duty positions (since a medical determination was made that they
could not return to full duty), all three plaintiffs sought and received occupational disability
retirements. The plaintiffs filed suit against the city on the grounds that: 1) they were “otherwise
qualified individuals” within the meaning of the ADA; 2) the city failed to provide reasonable
accommodations by not offering them permanent light duty positions and/or by not reassigning
them to other positions within the city; 3) the city had failed to implement policies and procedures
to facilitate implementation of the ADA; 4) the city engaged in disparate treatment of police officers
with disabilities, since some remained employed at full salary and others were required to retire; and
5) the city had inconsistently applied the essential job functions criteria in violation of the ADA.
The city contended that the ability to make a forcible arrest and to fire a weapon were essential job
functions of a police officer. Further, the city contended that a police officer who could not
perform these functions represented a danger to himself or herself, to other officers, and to the
public. They argued that the ADA states that a disabled individual is not “qualified” if he or she
poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others that reasonable accommodations will not
eliminate. The Court agreed with the city, noting that eliminating these two essential functions
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would not be possible without fundamentally altering the nature of the job of a police officer.
However, the Court then examined what other reasonable accommodations the city would be
required to make. The Court decided that the city failed to show that the plaintiffs were not
qualified individuals with a disability and that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement
includes reassignment and imposes a duty on employers to consider that alternative.
Greist v. Norristown State Hospital, No. Civ. A. 96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097 (E.D. Pa.)
The plaintiff was found not guilty by reason of insanity in a murder case and was committed to
Norristown State Hospital in Pennsylvania. The Chester County Court ruled that he was severely
mentally disabled and posed a “clear and present danger to others.” The plaintiff sued the hospital
in 1996, alleging that its failure to treat his dyslexia in an outpatient setting was a violation of Title II
of the ADA’s integration mandate. The hospital asserted that he was not qualified for outpatient
services because of the danger he posed to others because of his mental illness; and in any case, the
hospital did not provide outpatient treatment for dyslexia to any of its patients.
The Court ruled that the plaintiff did not meet the ADA’s definition of “qualified person with a
disability” since the Chester County Court had already determined that he did not meet the stated
requirement for release (i.e., non-dangerousness). Further, the Court stated that it was difficult to
conceive of an accommodation by which highly dangerous insanity acquittees could be adequately
supervised to prevent harm to others on an outpatient basis. Thus, providing him outpatient
treatment would constitute a fundamental alteration of the State’s involuntary commitment program
by making an essential purpose of the program -- protecting the community -- impossible to
accomplish. The Court determined that the hospital did not discriminate against the plaintiff by not
treating his dyslexia on an outpatient basis, since nothing in the ADA would require the hospital to
provide such treatment to him if it did not provide it to anyone in the first place.
McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, 119 F.3d 453; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
18826
The plaintiff, a high school student diagnosed as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), a seizure disorder, and a learning disability wished to play basketball; however, this was his
ninth semester enrolled at the school. Michigan High School Athletic Association (MHSAA)
regulations prohibited athletes from playing beyond eight semesters, although the rule could be
waived under certain conditions based on a case-by-case review. The plaintiff asked for a waiver of
the eight-semester rule. The MHSAA denied the request, raising the issue of “red-shirting,” the
practice whereby athletes are intentionally held back from competition for one or more semesters
solely to allow them to develop more maturity and athletic ability. The plaintiff sued, alleging that
his rights under Title II of the ADA had been violated. The district court, concluding that the
plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, granted an injunction.
The Appeals Court reversed. It noted that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the eight-semester
rule was constructed or motivated by desires to bar students with learning disabilities from playing.
It was a neutral rule that applied to all students, regardless of their disability status. The Court found
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that a complete waiver was not a reasonable accommodation and would constitute a fundamental
alteration of the MHSAA’s policies and program. The MHSAA, according to the Court, would be
subjected to an “immense financial and administrative burden” as a result of a “floodgate” of waiver
requests. Finally, the Court stated that permitting this waiver would jeopardize one of the
fundamental purposes of the MHSAA rule, namely to prevent the practice of red-shirting.
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Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
The plaintiff, who had been offered a full collegiate athletic scholarship, was diagnosed with a
generalized anxiety disorder and a specific phobia relating to test taking. The scholarship offer was
contingent on attaining “qualifier” status with the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),
which required that he achieve a certain score on the American College Test (ACT). A psychologist
recommended that he be allowed to take the ACT in a nonstandard fashion. After three tries under
the nonstandard conditions he achieved a high enough score to meet the NCAA requirements,
provided that it recognized the scores from nonstandard test administration. The NCAA’s policy
was to accept scores achieved during nonstandard administrations for “learning-disabled or
handicapped students.” The NCAA concluded that the plaintiff did not meet either criteria and did
not certify him as a qualifier. He sued, alleging that the NCAA’s failure to recognize these scores
constituted discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodations, a violation of Title
III of the ADA.
The NCAA argued that allowing Tatum to compete when he was “clearly ineligible” would
fundamentally alter the NCAA’s ability to enforce its academic standards for student athletes. The
Court found that Tatum did not meet the definition of a qualified person with a disability, due to a
series of conflicting diagnoses that raised questions as to the nature of his condition. Since the
plaintiff failed to meet the definition, the Court did not address the question of reasonable
accommodation. It stated, however, that untimed tests were not an unreasonable accommodation
when requests were properly substantiated and that acceptance of them would not fundamentally
alter the nature of the NCAA eligibility criteria in the case of a person with a confirmed disability
with a history of accommodations. The plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction against the
NCAA was denied.
Kathleen S. v. Department of Public Welfare 10 F. Supp. 2d 460; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9558
This class action suit was brought by a group of persons with mental illness disabilities who were
patients at Haverford State Hospital in Pennsylvania, slated for closure in 1998. The plaintiffs
alleged three violations of the ADA: 1) the class members were not provided with services in the
most integrated setting appropriate to their needs; 2) the State utilized discriminatory methods of
administration by failing to appropriately plan for the development of community services; and 3)
past methods of administration subjected class members to continued, unnecessary segregation in an
institution. The plaintiffs requested the State provide them with community-based services at dates
earlier than those planned. The State claimed that the Plaintiff class was seeking large-scale
deinstitutionalization, which is not required in the ADA. It contended that the reasonable
modifications sought by the plaintiffs constituted a fundamental alteration of the State’s policies,
practices, and procedures.
The Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, noting the history of mental health legislation in
Pennsylvania emphasized that in treating persons with mental disabilities, “in every case the least
restrictions consistent with adequate treatment shall be employed.” Thus the plaintiffs were merely
requesting that the State fulfill its own obligations under State law, which was not “unreasonable.”
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The Court noted: “The denial of community placements to individuals with disabilities such as the
members of the Plaintiff class in this action is precisely the kind of segregation that Congress sought
to eliminate. [The State] has violated the core principles underlying the ADA's integration
mandate.”
Olmstead v. L.C. 527 U.S. 581; 119 S. Ct. 2176; 144 L. Ed. 2d 540; 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4368
The plaintiffs, two women with mental disabilities, were patients in an inpatient psychiatric unit.
Although treatment professionals concluded that each of the women could be cared for
appropriately in a community-based program, the women remained institutionalized at the hospital.
The women filed suit, alleging that Georgia had violated Title II of the ADA by failing to place them
in a community-based program once their treating professionals had determined that such
placement was appropriate. The State argued that inadequate funding, not discrimination on the
basis of disability, was the reason why the plaintiffs remained at the hospital, an argument which the
District Court rejected. The Court concluded that under Title II unnecessary institutional
segregation of persons with disabilities constituted discrimination per se and could not be justified by
lack of funding. The State argued that requiring immediate transfers to residential placements would
constitute a fundamental alteration of its programs and policies and thus was not required by the
ADA. The Court rejected this argument and the plaintiffs were discharged to community-based
treatment settings. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision and
remanded the case for consideration of whether the additional cost of treating the plaintiffs in the
community was reasonable in light of the demands on the State’s mental health budget
The Supreme Court held that under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide persons with
mental disabilities with community-based treatment rather than placement in institutions, when: (1)
the State's treatment professionals have determined that community placement is appropriate; (2)
the transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected
individual; and (3) the community placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account
the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.
Rodriguez v. City of New York 197 F.3d 611; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24935
The plaintiffs, a group of New York Medicaid-eligible persons with mental disabilities, all required
assistance with activities of daily living and were receiving personal care services based on their
needs as determined by New York’s “task-based assessment” (TBA) programs, which did not
include safety monitoring services. The plaintiffs alleged that without those services, the personal
care services they did receive were inadequate to meet their needs and to allow them to continue
living in their homes. They claimed that this omission constituted unlawful discrimination against
otherwise eligible, mentally disabled patients in violation of the ADA.
The Appeals Court noted that New York provided identical services to both mentally and physically
disabled Medicaid recipients. Safety monitoring services were not provided to either group. It
stated, “Thus, New York cannot have unlawfully discriminated against appellees by denying a
benefit it provides to no one.” The Court further noted that in Olmstead v. L.C., the ruling was that
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while States must adhere to the ADA’s nondiscrimination requirement, nothing in the ADA
compels States to provide new benefits, only that benefits be offered and administered without
discrimination.
Cramer v. Chiles 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1066
This class action suit was brought on behalf of 2,176 persons with developmental disabilities
residing in private intermediate care facilities against the State of Florida in 1996. At issue was
whether the State of Florida, by legislation, could summarily deny an eligible person with a
developmental disability a choice between an intensive care facility or the Home and CommunityBased Waiver program (“HCBW”) for support and services.
The plaintiffs alleged that the State engaged in a discriminatory manner in violation of Title II of the
ADA in its proposed elimination of private Intermediate Care Facilities for the Developmentally
Disabled (“ICF/DD”) and moving them to State-operated Developmental Service Institutes
(“DSIs”). The Court stated that segregation is a form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA; as a
matter of law integration is affirmatively required. Further, the Court stated that underfunding of
the Home and Community-Based Waiver program “compelled institutionalization, thus negating a
meaningful choice.” The Court ordered the State to begin transition planning for the plaintiffs.
Although the State claimed that decision would force significant departure from past practices and
would create administrative havoc in the absence of adequate funding and sufficient time for
program structuring, “the issues presented, as convincingly shown by credible expert testimony, are
all too frequently matters of life and death for ICF-DDs beneficiaries. For that reason delays must
be minimal.”
PGA Tours, Inc. v. Martin 532 U.S. 661; 121 S. Ct. 1879; 149 L. Ed. 2d 904; 2001 U.S. LEXIS
4115
The plaintiff, a professional golfer with a degenerative circulatory disorder in one leg, asked the
Professional Golfers Association (PGA) for permission to use a golf cart in the final round of its
qualifying tournament. Under the PGA rules, golfers are allowed to use carts in the first two rounds
but not in the final round. The PGA refused to waive its “no carts” rule. The plaintiff filed suit
alleging a violation of the public accommodations provisions of Title III of the ADA The PGA
argued that: (1) it was not a place of public accommodation; and (2) allowing Martin to use a cart
would fundamentally alter the nature of the golf competition.
After a trial, both the District Court and an Appeals Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff stating that
permitting the plaintiff to use a cart during the tournaments would not fundamentally alter the
nature of the tournaments. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the game of golf was
fundamentally about making shots and putts, not about traveling from one hole to the next; thus,
allowing the plaintiff to use a cart was a reasonable accommodation that did not fundamentally alter
the nature of the game.
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Johnson v. K Mart No. 99-14563, D.C. Docket No. 98-02383-CV-T-25E (November 2001)
The plaintiff retired from K Mart with long-term disability benefits based on a mental illness
diagnosis. Under K Mart’s plan, employees who are disabled due to mental illness may receive
salary-replacement benefits for a period of two years, whereas employees who retire with physical
disabilities may receive these benefits until age 65. Johnson filed suit, claiming that the cap on
mental health-related disability benefits violated Title I of the ADA. K Mart claimed that providing
different levels of long-term disability benefits to individuals with mental and physical disabilities did
not constitute discrimination within the meaning of the ADA.
The Appeals Court addressed for the first time whether distinguishing between physical and mental
disabilities in the context of long-term disability benefits was permissible. Citing Olmstead v. L.C. and
other caselaw, the Court concluded that K Mart’s plan appeared to violate Title I as a prima facie case
of discrimination. The Court examined the ADA’s provisions for the safe harbor exemption that
addresses the use of a subterfuge. The Appeals Court concluded that the subterfuge exception to
the safe harbor provision requires that a plaintiff show that the employer specifically intended to
discriminate based on disability, regardless whether the discrimination was aimed at fringe-benefit or
non-fringe-benefit aspects of the employment relationship. It reversed the District Court’s decision
to grant K Mart’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
the Appeals Court opinion.
Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15287
The plaintiffs were patients with traumatic brain injuries (TBI) or diagnosed as nonretarded
developmentally disabled (NRDD) who were being treated in Maryland State psychiatric hospitals.
The plaintiffs claimed that the State violated their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
by failing to provide them community treatment rather than institutional care. The State argued that
hospital environments are “at least as ‘integrated’ as community placement, if not more so.” The
Court rejected this argument with virtually no discussion, noting that there was little caselaw or
evidence on the record to support it. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs, based on Olmstead v. L.C.,
had been discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities by showing that they remained
unjustifiably institutionalized despite their eligibility for community-based treatment.
The State contended that accommodating the plaintiffs would result in a fundamental alteration to
the existing program because it would be unmanageably expensive to accelerate the process of
finding or creating community placements for TBI/NRDD patients beyond the efforts already
being made. The Court concluded that the State had made significant progress in reducing
inappropriate institutionalizations through its policy and programmatic activities and that it had a
waiting list that was moving at a reasonable pace. The Court determined that the modification the
plaintiffs requested would require the State to move faster than it was reasonable to expect, would
incur undue financial burdens, and would result in a fundamental alteration of the State’s provision
of services.
Bryson v. Shumway, No. 02-1059, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21492
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The State had appealed a decision of the District Court for the District of New Hampshire that
found for the plaintiffs, holding that the Medicaid waiver program must include 200 slots. The
Court of Appeals overturned the grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on this issue.
The plaintiffs were individuals with acquired brain disorders attempting to obtain medical services
by obtaining a slot in the State’s model Medicaid waiver program without having to remain on a long
waiting list. The plaintiffs argued that the waiver program was required to have at least as many
slots as the number of applicants, up to a limit of 200, and that the available slots were not filled
within a reasonable time. The plaintiffs alleged among other charges, a violation of the “reasonable
promptness” portion of the Medicaid statute.
The Court of Appeals found that the statutory language governs only the Secretary’s ability to deny
approval of waiver plans, but failed to govern the behavior of the states, or the contents of the
waiver plans themselves. The Court reasoned that States are not required to develop optional
waiver programs of a designated size, because to do so could discourage the State from creating
optional programs at all.
Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, No. 02CV-762P(C) Order signed October 31, 2002.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment granted.
The plaintiffs were individuals with various unidentified disabilities, who lived in their own homes,
and received services through a Medicaid home and community-based waiver program. The
plaintiffs claimed that the State’s new policy regarding prescriptions would inappropriately require
them to move into institutions, in violation of the ADA. They requested that the State provide
reasonable accommodations in order to receive needed medical services.
The State health care agency had changed the program services so that all beneficiaries would be
limited to five prescriptions per month as long as they remained in the community. However, all
residents of institutions would continue to receive unlimited prescriptions.
The Court held that the requested modification of permitting unlimited prescriptions to waiver
program beneficiaries would cause a fundamental alteration of the State’s services and programs, and
permitted a cost-based defense. The Court accepted the State’s explanation that it had experienced a
shortfall in collected revenue, and all agencies were forced to cut budgets. These budget cuts
required the prescription limits. Since the waiver program was an option, the State could reasonably
reduce benefits rather than choose to eliminate the entire program. Individuals residing in
institutions would continue to receive unlimited prescriptions because of the mandatory nature of
the care.
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